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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Roy Parrott is currently serving a life sentence for a 1976 
murder conviction, based on a violation of Virgin Islands 
territorial law. He is appealing the dismissal by the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands of his petition for collateral relief 
under the Virgin Islands habeas statute, S 1303, Title 5 of 
the V.I. Code. Parrott's claim poses a variation on issues we 
have been facing when we interpret the 1984 amendments 
to the Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act. In Parrott's 
appeal, we must decide whether the Revised Organic Act's 
changes to the jurisdictions both of the District Court and 
of the Territorial Court, the local Virgin Islands court, 
operate to vest jurisdiction solely with the Territorial Court 
for habeas petitions arising from convictions for violations 
of territorial law. The District Court answered"no" to this 
question. We conclude, however, that the correct answer is 
"yes." We will, therefore, reverse the dismissal of the habeas 
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petition by the District Court and remand this case to it for 
remand to the Territorial Court for further proceedings. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Twenty-four years ago, the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, sitting as a local court of general jurisdiction, 
convicted Parrott of first degree murder and of possession 
of an unlicenced firearm and sentenced him to life in prison 
without possibility of parole. Both crimes were violations 
solely of the Virgin Islands local criminal code. Parrott twice 
challenged his conviction by direct appeal to this Court but 
was ultimately unsuccessful. On his first appeal, we 
remanded Parrott's case to the District Court for a new 
trial. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 
553 (3d Cir. 1977) (remanding for concerns about jury 
impartiality). The second trial ended with a hung jury. A 
third trial was held, and at its conclusion the jury found 
Parrott guilty of both crimes. The District Court reimposed 
a life sentence without parole. Parrott appealed the 
conviction. This time, we found no error and affirmed. 
 
Parrott then twice petitioned the District Court for 
collateral relief under the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255.1 Section 2255 authorizes review of sentences for 
violations of federal laws. In his first petition, in 1984, the 
District Court considered the merits and denied the 
petition. We affirmed. Parrott's second petition under 
S 2255 was rejected because it failed to overcome the 
limitations that S 2255 places on successive federal habeas 
actions. 
 
In July 1998, Parrott made a third attempt to obtain 
habeas relief, this time from the Territorial Court under the 
local Virgin Islands habeas statute. See 5 V.I. Code Ann. 
SS 1301-1325 (1997). The Territorial Court dismissed his 
petition "without prejudice to refile in the District Court," 
reasoning that, although the Territorial Court had 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought under the local 
law, as a matter of comity and judicial economy the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. His first petition was filed under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 but treated by the 
District Court as if it had been filed under S 2255. 
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Court was the better forum to hear the petition because it 
had convicted and sentenced Parrott. See Parrott v. 
Government of Virgin Islands, Misc. No. 58/98 (Terr. Ct. V.I. 
July 17, 1998), JA at 3-8. 
 
Parrott appealed the dismissal to the District Court 
Appellate Division, which reviewed the matter in its 
capacity as a local appellate court. Although the District 
Court affirmed the dismissal, it relied on other grounds to 
do so. The District Court recognized that, as a result of the 
1984 amendments to Revised Organic Act and the 
subsequent expansion of the Territorial Court's jurisdiction, 
the District Court had been divested of original jurisdiction 
over questions of purely local civil law, including habeas 
petitions. The District Court concluded, however, that this 
divestiture did not extend to all local habeas petitions and 
that the Territorial Court's jurisdiction for local habeas 
petitions extended only to prisoners that it had sentenced. 
Prisoners sentenced under territorial law by the District 
Court, in contrast, still had to submit their S 1303 habeas 
petitions to the District Court. See Parrott v. Government of 
Virgin Islands, 56 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595-96 (D.V.I. 1999). 
 
The District Court emphasized that, because the 1984 
amendments reconfigured its relationship with the 
Territorial Court to mirror the relationship between federal 
and state courts, the Territorial Court could not review a 
decision originally made by the now "federalized" District 
Court in its former territorial capacity. Unless the District 
Court retained jurisdiction over petitions for S 1303 habeas 
relief from the prisoners it had sentenced under local law, 
those prisoners would be denied any habeas relief. That 
denial in turn would violate the Revised Organic Act's 
guarantee of the "great writ" to all Virgin Islands residents. 
To avoid that result, the District Court concluded that it 
must retain jurisdiction over local habeas petitions from 
prisoners like Parrott. See id. The District Court determined 
that because Parrott's petition had been filed in the 
Territorial Court, the dismissal of the petition by the 
Territorial Court was proper. It is this decision that Parrott 
now appeals. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction as an appellate court 
under both local law, 4 V.I. Code Ann. S 33, and the 
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Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. S 1613a(a). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, S 1294(3), which 
grants us appellate review over decisions from the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands, and the Revised Organic Act, 48 
U.S.C. S 1613a(c), which grants us appellate authority over 
the District Court's decisions on matters of local law. We 
review de novo the District Court's dismissal of a claim for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Revised 
Organic Act, including that court's "prediction, 
interpretation and application of Virgin Islands law." Brow 
v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
II. Territorial Court's Jurisdiction for Habeas Corpus 
Petitions under V.I. Law2 
 
A. Divestiture of District Court's Concurrent 
Jurisdiction Over Local Civil Actions 
 
Parrott's effort to obtain collateral relief before the 
Territorial Court under the local habeas statute requires us 
once again to clarify the scope of the jurisdictional changes 
brought about by Congress's 1984 amendments to the 
Revised Organic Act. See 48 U.S.C. SS 1611-1616 (West 
1987 & Supp. 2000).3 
 
With the 1984 amendments, Congress established the 
framework for a dual system of local and federal judicial 
review in the Virgin Islands. By virtue of these 
amendments, the District Court now possesses the 
jurisdiction of a "District Court of the United States." 48 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We find ourselves in the unique position of having both parties agree 
on the question of jurisdiction. For convenience, we will refer to both 
parties as "Parrott." Further, although the Virgin Islands government 
contended in its brief that we should also reach the merits of Parrott's 
petition, at argument the government withdrew that contention. 
 
3. The evolving roles of both the District Court and the Territorial Court 
prior to these amendments have been comprehensively reviewed in our 
other decisions. See e.g., Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 
1053-56 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. George , 625 F.2d 1081, 1087-88 
(3d Cir. 1980). As these opinions demonstrate, the District Court, before 
it was divested of original jurisdiction over local matters, served as a 
local, or territorial, court when hearing cases based on local law. 
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U.S.C. S 1612(a).4 After the 1984 amendments, the District 
Court continued to possess its statutorily granted local 
jurisdiction. The Virgin Islands Legislature was now able, 
however, to divest the District Court of original jurisdiction 
for local matters by vesting that jurisdiction in territorial 
courts established by local law for all causes for which "any 
court established by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction." 48 
U.S.C. S 1611(b). 
 
To the extent that that divestiture power is exercised by 
the legislature, the District Court loses jurisdiction to the 
Territorial Court over local matters.5  See 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612(b); see also Estate Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Ct. 
of Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that, following the enactment of S 1612, divestiture 
is not self-executing). Section 1612(b) provided the 
mechanism to eliminate the overlap between the District 
Court and the Territorial Court on local matters: 
 
       The purpose of section 22(b) [48 U.S.C. S 1612(b)] is to 
       eliminate the present situation of both the district 
       court and the local court having jurisdiction over 
       strictly local causes. Upon the effective date, the district 
       court will not [sic] longer have jurisdiction over any 
       cause over which local law has vested jurisdiction in 
       the local courts. The decision as to whether jurisdiction 
       over strictly local causes should be vested in the 
       district courts or the local courts will be made by local 
       law. At any time, . . . by vesting jurisdiction in the local 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although the Virgin Islands government argues in its brief that the 
1984 amendments effectively granted District Court jurisdiction for 
habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, we need not address this 
argument because Parrott's petition for habeas relief under local law 
does not put this issue in controversy. Moreover, as we held in Walker 
v. Government of Virgin Islands (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2000), as a result of 
1984 amendments, the District Court of the Virgin Islands now has 
jurisdiction over collateral challenges brought under S 2254. See id., 
slip 
opinion at 7-8. 
 
5. The District Court continues, however, to sit as an appellate court to 
review local matters decided by the Territorial Court. See 48 U.S.C. 
S 1613a(a). 
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       courts, the local law will have the effect of divesting the 
       district court of jurisdiction. 
 
103 Cong. Rec. S10527 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (statement 
by Sen. Weicker) (emphasis added). 
 
This divestiture is reinforced by S 1613 of the Revised 
Organic Act, which formalizes the separate institutional 
relationship between the District Court and the Territorial 
Court for, among other questions, habeas petitions: 
 
       The relations between the courts established by the 
       Constitution or laws of the United States and the 
       courts established by local law with respect to . . . the 
       issuance of writs of habeas corpus . . . shall be 
       governed by the laws of the United States pertaining to 
       the relations between the courts of the United States, 
       including the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
       the courts of the several States in such matters and 
       proceedings. 
 
48 U.S.C. S 1613. This section ensures "that the relations 
between the local courts of the Virgin Islands and the 
federal courts . . . shall be the same as the relation between 
the state courts and the federal courts . . . ." 130 Cong. 
Rec. S10527 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (statement by Sen. 
Weicker). 
 
The Territorial Legislature took the first steps toward 
eliminating concurrent jurisdiction in 1991 when it divested 
the District Court of original jurisdiction over purely local 
civil matters. See 4 V.I. Code Ann. S 76(a) (1997).6 As we 
reasoned in Brow, S 1613 of the Revised Organic Act acts in 
combination with S 76(a) of the V.I. Code to effectively 
repeal any grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the District 
Court over local actions once the Virgin Islands Legislature 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This provision reads: 
 
       Subject to the original jurisdiction conferred on the District 
Court by 
       section 22 [48 U.S.C. S 1612] of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, 
as 
       amended, effective October 1, 1991, the Territorial Court shall 
have 
       original jurisdiction in all civil actions regardless of the amount 
in 
       controversy . . . . 
 
4 V.I. Code Ann. S 76(a) (1997). 
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has vested jurisdiction over local civil actions in the 
Territorial Court. See Brow, 994 F.2d at 1035-36 
(recognizing implicit repeal in 4 V.I. Code Ann.S 32). 
 
Because habeas proceedings are generally considered 
civil in nature, see Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 
(1987), the term "civil action" includes habeas petitions.7 
Thus, S 76(a)'s implied repeal of the District Court's 
jurisdiction for local civil actions governs our interpretation 
of the grant of jurisdiction in S 1303. 
 
The situation here is complicated, however, by the fact 
that, despite S 76(a)'s grant of jurisdiction in local actions to 
the Territorial Court, the Virgin Islands code continues to 
provide that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus may be granted by 
the district court, upon petition by or on behalf of any 
person restrained of his liberty." 5 V.I. Code Ann. S 1303 
(emphasis added). We must, therefore, determine whether 
the 1984 amendments affected the jurisdictional provisions 
inherent in the language of S 1303 in that that section's 
specific reference to writs of habeas corpus being granted 
by the district court has never been amended. However, 
when interpreting other Virgin Islands statutes in which the 
grant of jurisdiction over civil actions had been made 
expressly to the "district court," as it was in the habeas 
provision, we have reached the conclusion that the 
reference to the "district court" had been impliedly 
repealed. See Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. v. Rawlins, 70 
F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 1995) (construing implied repeal for 
5 V.I. Code Ann. S 1421); Tamarind Resort Assoc. v. 
Government of Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Admittedly, habeas corpus proceedings are hybrid ones, providing a 
civil remedy for a person in custody under criminal laws. These 
proceedings have, however, been treated as civil, rather than criminal, 
ones for purposes of determining jurisdiction. See Ex parte Tom Tong, 
108 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (concluding habeas is civil proceeding for 
purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction). Although we more 
recently have construed the term "civil action" to exclude habeas 
petitions, we did so only in the procedural, not jurisdictional, context 
of 
the filing fees imposed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 
Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754-56 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing 
intent of Congress to limit this provision to civil actions over prison 
conditions brought under S 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act). 
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1998) (construing same for 21 V.I. Code Ann. S 913(d)). We 
conclude that there is ample precedent in our 
interpretation of other Virgin Islands statutes to conclude 
that the reference to the "district court" inS 1303 has been 
impliedly repealed by S 76(a). Cf. Walker v. Government of 
Virgin Islands (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2000) (holding that District 
Court properly determined it was without jurisdiction to 
grant habeas relief under S 1303 to prisoner convicted in 
Territorial Court). 
 
We note that when the District Court tried Parrott's case, 
it did so as a local court acting under its then general 
jurisdiction, which authorized it to serve the dual functions 
of local territorial and federal court. The District Court no 
longer fulfills these twin roles. Nevertheless, this former 
duality of function does not prevent us from finding that 
the elimination of the District Court's territorial function 
impliedly repealed its territorial habeas function. 
 
In sum, because S 76(a) operates to divest the District 
Court of jurisdiction for all civil actions, including habeas 
proceedings, we hold that the correct forum for Parrott's 
habeas petition under 5 V.I. Code Ann. S 1303 is not the 
District Court but the Territorial Court. Nor are we 
dissuaded from reaching this result because the District 
Court now has the jurisdiction of a "District Court of the 
United States." As explained in the next section, while that 
newly bestowed status circumscribes the District Court's 
original jurisdiction, it does not create a constitutional 
obstacle to the Territorial Court's review of its earlier 
decisions. 
 
B. Unified Sovereign Authority Under Article IV, S 3 
 
In analyzing whether the Territorial Court had 
jurisdiction for petitions brought under the Virgin Islands 
habeas statute, the District Court gave priority to the 
institutional separation between the two courts thatS 1613 
of the Revised Organic Act requires, rather than to the 
jurisdictional separation required by the Revised Organic 
Act's S 1612. This priority, however, is mistaken. Because 
both the Territorial Court and the District Court derive 
their power from the same sovereign, i.e., the U.S. 
Congress, the institutional separation is administrative 
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rather than constitutional. Consequently, this separation 
does not prevent the Territorial Court from reviewing prior 
decisions made by the District Court in cases in which the 
District Court sat as a local court. 
 
Because the separation is administrative rather than 
constitutional, when the jurisdiction of these courts is 
changed, as was accomplished by S 1612, there is no bar to 
the Territorial Court exercising its revised jurisdiction to 
review a judgment of the District Court made under 
territorial law. The jurisdictional separation discussed 
above indeed requires that the divesting of the District 
Court of its jurisdiction for local civil actions also strips it 
of jurisdiction for local habeas petitions from territorial 
prisoners like Parrott, even though the District Court 
sentenced those prisoners. 
 
Under our earlier reasoning in Brow and Moravian Sch. 
Advisory Bd., the Territorial Court possesses jurisdiction 
over local habeas provisions from prisoners it tried and 
sentenced. See Walker, slip opinion at 3-4 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 
2000) (citing Callwood v. Enos, slip opinion at 9 (3d Cir. 
Oct. 13, 2000)); Parrott, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 596 n.10. The 
District Court, nevertheless, concluded that our decision in 
Joseph v. DeCastro, 805 F. Supp. 1242 (D.V.I. 1992), aff'd, 
995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming without opinion), 
and the newly established "federal-state" relationship 
between the two courts, which the Revised Organic Act's 
S 1613 codified, prevented the Territorial Court from 
reviewing the District Court's earlier convictions. Were it to 
relinquish this jurisdiction, the District Court reasoned, 
prisoners such as Parrott would be deprived of habeas relief 
because territorial courts, like state courts, cannot review a 
federal District Court decision. See Parrott, 56 F. Supp. 2d 
at 596. This denial would in turn violate the Virgin Islands 
Bill of Rights, which guarantees that "[a]ll persons shall 
have the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
same shall not be suspended except as herein expressly 
provided." 48 U.S.C. S 1561 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000); see 
also Parrott, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 596. We are not persuaded, 
however, that this is the correct interpretation of the 
Revised Organic Act's revised jurisdictional scheme. 
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First, the decision in Joseph, which concluded that the 
District Court is the more appropriate forum for review of 
local habeas petitions, can be distinguished because at the 
time Joseph was decided, the District Court retained 
original jurisdiction over many local criminal actions. 
Moreover, the court in Joseph recognized that its 
conclusion would change at such time as jurisdiction over 
local crimes was vested in the local judicial system. Joseph, 
805 F. Supp. at 1252. As of 1994, however, when the Virgin 
Islands Legislature vested jurisdiction for all local crimes 
with the Territorial Court, that jurisdictional obstacle was 
removed. See 4 V.I. Code Ann. S 76(b)(1) & (c) (1997).8 Thus, 
the District Court now lacks the concurrent jurisdiction 
over local criminal actions that it shared with the Territorial 
Court at the time of Joseph.9 The elimination of concurrent 
jurisdiction does not prevent the Territorial Court from 
reviewing District Court decisions before 1994 that were 
based on local law. It does, however, preclude the local 
court's review, under the local habeas law, of any District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This provision reads: 
 
       Upon the effective date of this section, subject to the concurrent 
       jurisdiction conferred on the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
by 
       sections 21 and 22 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin 
Islands, 
       as amended, the Territorial Court shall have original jurisdiction 
in 
       all criminal actions. 
 
       . . . 
 
       This section shall become effective January 1, 1994. 
 
1993 V.I. Sess. L. 5890, SS 1, 3. 
 
9. The District Court's decision also misconstrues the current scope of 
its concurrent jurisdiction for criminal matters. See Parrott, 56 F. Supp. 
2d at 596 n.8. Section 22(c) of the Revised Organic Act, codified at 48 
U.S.C. S 1612(c), grants the District Court concurrent jurisdiction only 
over those cases for which the District Court retains jurisdiction under 
S 22(a) or (b), codified respectively at 48 U.S.C. SS 1612(a) and 1612(b). 
As noted above, the District Court no longer retains original jurisdiction 
over local criminal matters. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, S 76(b)(1) & (c). 
For 
the same reason, our decision in United States v. Kennings, 861 F.2d 
381 (3d Cir. 1988), that the District Court of the Virgin Islands sits as 
a district rather than local court when hearing local criminal matters, is 
distinguishable from Parrott's case. See id. at 389. 
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Court criminal convictions decided after 1994. The 
Territorial Court can only exercise habeas review of cases in 
which it is the successor court to the District Court of the 
District Court's now-terminated territorial jurisdiction.10 
 
The District Court was reluctant to construe the 
Territorial Court's habeas jurisdiction to parallel our 
reasoning in Brow and Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. because 
it wished to avoid having the Territorial Court review the 
decision of a "federal" court. This purported federalism 
concern is, however, a red herring: The restructuring of the 
relationship between the District Court and the Territorial 
Court in SS 1612 and 1613 of the Revised Organic Act 
requires the opposite conclusion. 
 
The District Court's power originates under Article IV, 
S 3, which authorizes Congress to regulate the various U.S. 
territories. See Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491 
(1904) (recognizing Congress's plenary power to define 
institutional relationships in territories). Congress exercises 
this authority through the Revised Organic Act, which 
serves as the Virgin Islands constitution. See  48 U.S.C. 
SS 1541-1645 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000); Brow, 994 F.2d at 
1032. As such, the Revised Organic Act is also the source 
of authority for the Virgin Islands Legislature. See 48 
U.S.C. S 1574(a). It is through the Revised Organic Act that 
Congress authorizes the local legislature to grant the 
Territorial Court its jurisdiction. See 48 U.S.C. S1611(b). 
Consequently, both the Territorial Court and the District 
Court derive their respective jurisdictional grants from the 
same sovereign -- namely, Congress, exercising its 
authority under Article IV, S 3. 
 
As a result, the District Court does not derive its 
jurisdiction, as do other federal courts, from Article III. See 
United States v. George, 625 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 
1980).11 Nor has the District Court previously been treated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The one limitation on this general separation of jurisdiction for 
local 
criminal matters is when a charged local crime relates to federal crimes 
as well. In that instance, the District Court retains concurrent 
jurisdiction. See Callwood v. Enos, slip opinion at 7 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 
2000). 
11. As the George court observed: 
 
       [The District Court of the Virgin Islands] is, of course, a court 
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as "a court of the United States" or, as we say more 
commonly, as an Article III court. See generally United 
States v. Kennings, 861 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1988). In 
Kennings, we applied the federal anti-bribery statute to 
proceedings in the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
because the statute covered the solicitation of bribes before 
"any court," not just to bribery attempts by witnesses 
appearing before courts "of the United States." Id. at 388- 
89. Indeed, the District Court continues, even after the 
1984 amendments, to classify itself as territorial, rather 
than federal, in a constitutional sense. See 35 Acres Assoc. 
v. Adams, 962 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D.V.I. 1997). 
 
Thus, while Congress has elected, for administrative 
purposes, to treat the Virgin Islands as a separate 
sovereign, see Government of Virgin Islands v. Schneider, 
893 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D.V.I. 1995), the constitutional 
relationship between the territories and the federal 
government remains unified: 
 
       [I]n a federal Territory and the Nation, as in a city and 
       a State, "[t]here is but one system of government, or of 
       laws operating within [its] limits." City and State, or 
       Territory and Nation, are not two separate sovereigns 
       to whom the citizen owes separate allegiance in any 
       meaningful sense, but one alone. 
 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 321 (1978) (internal 
citations omitted). Moreover, "vesting a territorial court with 
jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of 
the United States does not make it a `District Court of the 
United States.' " Mookini v. United States , 303 U.S. 201, 205 
(1938). See also Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 551- 
52 (1989) (holding that Supreme Court lacked supervisory 
power over District Court of the Virgin Islands because that 
court was not an Article III federal district court). Before the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       created by act of Congress, under the power to make rules and 
       regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States 
       given by Article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, but is not a 
court 
       of the United States created under Article III, section 1. 
 
625 F.2d at 1088-89. 
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1984 amendments, the District Court considered itself a 
local court, see George, 625 F.2d at 1088, so that, for the 
purposes of Parrott's trial, the District Court sat as a local 
court. Federalism concerns, therefore, are not implicated in 
matters where the District Court, in the past, reviewed 
questions of local law sitting as a territorial court and 
exercising its general jurisdiction. See Spink v. General 
Accident Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 689, 
691 n.6 (D.V.I. 1999). 
 
Until 1994, the District Court and the Territorial Court 
had concurrent jurisdiction over most criminal actions and 
thus shared power over these local actions. Now, that 
jurisdiction lies solely in the Territorial Court. In this sense, 
the Territorial Court's authority to review certain District 
Court criminal convictions under local law is akin to that of 
a successor court's power to review the decisions of its 
predecessor in jurisdiction. See Excavation Constr., Inc. No. 
One Contracting Corp. v. Quinn, 673 F.2d 78, 80 (3d Cir. 
1982) (recognizing territorial court's successor jurisdiction 
to municipal court). Cf. Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. 1981) (recognizing its successor jurisdiction from 
former Court of Chancery); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. 
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 311 A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1973) (recognizing its successor jurisdiction 
from former Superior Court); Schiller v. Flatbush Message 
Bureau, Inc., 108 N.Y.S.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) 
(recognizing its successor jurisdiction from courts of colony 
of New York). 
 
Treating the Territorial Court as a successor court, 
moreover, is consistent with Congress's objective to 
eliminate the situation in which the District Court and the 
Territorial Court share jurisdiction over purely local 
matters. It also unifies in a single tribunal the review of 
habeas petitions initiated under territorial law for territorial 
law convictions. By contrast, the District Court's approach 
would bifurcate this review so that prisoners sentenced 
under local law by the District Court would have to submit 
their local law petitions to that court, while all other 
territorial prisoners would submit their petitions for review 
by the Territorial Court. 
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Finally, S 1613's administrative separation of the two 
courts does not implicitly deprive prisoners like Parrott of 
their guaranteed right to habeas relief under the Revised 
Organic Act's S 1561. No federalism concerns are implicated 
when the two courts share, as products of Congress's 
authority under Article IV, S 3, the same sovereign as the 
source of their jurisdiction. For that reason, the restrictions 
placed on the District Court's original jurisdiction by S 1612 
properly limit review of local habeas petitions to the 
Territorial Court. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Consistent with congressional purpose, S 76(a)'s implied 
repeal of the District Court's jurisdiction for local civil 
actions merely alters the forum for reviewing a local habeas 
petition; it does not deprive prisoners like Parrott of their 
guaranteed access to "the great writ." Consequently, we will 
reverse the District Court's conclusion that it retains 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions under S 1303, Title 5 of 
the V.I. Code, if those petitions are submitted by prisoners 
over whose convictions the District Court presided as a 
local court of general jurisdiction. For the reasons stated 
above, we conclude that the District Court was acting as a 
"local court" when it sentenced Parrott. For that reason, the 
Territorial Court is now the proper forum for review of 
Parrott's local habeas petition. We will remand this matter 
to the Territorial Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In remanding, we are in no way commenting on the merits of 
Parrott's petition or on the circumstances under which the Territorial 
Court may decline to exercise its Section 1303 jurisdiction over a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
I agree with the majority's conclusion that following the 
changes to the jurisdiction of the Territorial Court and the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, described in detail in 
Walker v. Government of the Virgin Islands (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 
2000), and Callwood v. Enos (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2000), the 
Territorial Court has jurisdiction under the Virgin Islands 
statute, 5 V.I.C. S 1303, to grant a writ of habeas corpus 
even though S 1303 does not explicitly so state.1 Unlike the 
majority, however, I would not remand this matter so that 
the Territorial Court can rule on Parrott's S 1303 petition. 
 
The Territorial Court has already considered Parrott's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under S 1303 and it 
denied the petition on July 17, 1998. It did not deny the 
petition because it believed it had no jurisdiction. Instead, 
it concluded that "[a] determination by the Territorial Court 
on the merits of this matter would not serve the ends of 
justice." Parrott v. Government of the Virgin Islands, Misc. 
No. 58/98, slip op. at 5 (Terr. Ct. V.I. July 17, 1998). When 
it denied Parrott's petition without prejudice to his right to 
refile in the District Court it did not know that we would 
hold that the District Court had no jurisdiction under 
S 1303. However, nothing in the Territorial Court's opinion 
suggests that our holding would have made a difference in 
its denial of the petition. 
 
The Territorial Court noted that it would create"a 
jurisdictional quagmire" were it to rule on decisions 
previously entered by the federal courts and it exercised its 
discretion to defer to those courts. It noted that the U.S. 
Attorney's Office for the District of the Virgin Islands, not 
the Office of the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, was 
the prosecutorial body which had presented the case to the 
District Court; that the Territorial Court is not and should 
not act as an appellate court for the District Court; that 
there are unanswered procedural issues with respect to the 
relationship between the Territorial Court and the Office of 
the U.S. Attorney; and that the District Court was more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The statutory language provides, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus may be 
granted by the district court, upon petition by or on behalf of any person 
restrained of his liberty." 5 V.I.C. S 1303 (emphasis added). 
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familiar than the Territorial Court with the procedural 
posture, record of proceedings, and arguments raised on 
the first two petitions and appeals. Significantly, the 
Territorial Court noted that in Saunders v. United States, 
373 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a 
successive habeas petition may be dismissed if the same 
ground presented in the subsequent petition was 
determined adversely to the petitioner on the prior petition, 
the prior determination was on the merits, and the ends of 
justice would not be served by reconsideration of the claim. 
 
In Parrott's original petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
filed in the District Court following Parrott's conviction in 
the District Court of the territorial crimes offirst degree 
murder and possession of an unlicensed firearm, Parrott 
asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of his 
speedy trial right, and failure to give a cautionary  
instruction.2 The District Court denied the petition on the 
merits and we affirmed. Parrott's second petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255 again raised 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as Brady 
violations and an erroneous instruction, and was 
transferred to this court for consideration as an application 
to file a second or successive petition. This court denied 
that application. 
 
Parrott's S 1303 petition alleges ineffective assistance of 
counsel (yet again), denial of his Fifth Amendment right to 
due process and a fair jury trial, and the inapplicability of 
14 V.I.C. S 2253, the Virgin Islands statute under which he 
was convicted of the weapons charge. App. at 11-31. These 
claims were available to Parrott at the time hefiled his first 
motion under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. Allowing this duplicative 
proceeding to continue would be contrary to Congress's 
policy to eliminate successive habeas petitions. 
 
The Territorial Court so recognized, as it referred to the 
Saunders holding authorizing dismissal of successive 
habeas petitions and it dismissed Parrott's petition after 
expressly concluding that "the ends of justice" are not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the prior petitions have not been included in the Appendix, 
we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the summary by the 
Government of the Virgin Islands in its brief. 
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served by reconsideration of the claim. It would be a 
needless expenditure of judicial time and effort to direct 
Parrott's third petition for collateral relief back to the 
Territorial Court on remand. The majority's bland 
statement that it is not commenting on the merits of 
Parrott's petition, see Maj. Op. at 15 n.12, does not, in my 
opinion, justify its decision. 
 
Parrott has not only had ample opportunity to have his 
request for collateral relief reviewed but he took full 
advantage of that opportunity. I see no reason to give him 
a third opportunity now, some 23 years after his conviction, 
a conviction that was affirmed by this court on direct 
appeal. Because the Territorial Court's ruling was not a 
jurisdictional one and it already has set forth its views of 
Parrott's petition, I think the majority is unnecessarily 
playing ping pong with this case. 
 
The majority rationalizes its decision that Parrott may 
now file his third petition for collateral relief in the 
Territorial Court under S 1303 on the theory that the 
District Court was acting as a Territorial Court when it was 
the forum for Parrott's trial on murder and unlawful 
firearm possession. Not only does that fail to justify the 
successive petition but it also fails to acknowledge that 
when the District Court denied Parrott's motion under 28 
U.S.C. S 2255 and this court affirmed that denial, we were 
acting as federal courts. I know of no authority, and the 
majority cites none, that would give the Territorial Court 
jurisdiction to review that decision. Therefore, I would 
affirm the order of the District Court Appellate Division 
dismissing Parrott's petition, albeit for different reasons 
than those given by that court. 
 
Moreover, I am concerned that footnote 4 of the 
majority's opinion unnecessarily introduces into this 
opinion concerned with jurisdiction under S 1303 references 
to 28 U.S.C. S 2254, a statutory provision that is irrelevant 
to the issue in this case. It is, of course, true that in Walker 
we hold that the District Court of the Virgin Islands now 
has jurisdiction over challenges brought under S 2254. 
However, Walker was convicted in Territorial Court, not in 
District Court as here, and presumably would not have 
been able to invoke S 2255. The three opinions we issue 
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today need not consider the habeas corpus route to be 
taken by a defendant who is convicted in the future in the 
District Court in a case where that court retains concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Territorial Court. See 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612(c); S 22 of the Revised Organic Act. I believe that the 
number of cases in which the local crimes charged are 
related to federal crimes may be more significant than the 
majority suggests by its relegation of that concurrent 
jurisdiction to a footnote. See Maj. Op. at 12 n.10. See also 
Callwood v. Enos (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2000). Hopefully, the 
majority's footnote 4 will not be interpreted to suggest that 
jurisdiction will be under S 2254 for the territorial crime 
and S 2255 for the federal crime, further contributing to the 
"judicial quagmire" referred to by the Territorial Court. 
 
For the reasons set forth, I dissent from the decision of 
the majority in this case. 
 
A True Copy: 
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